Nov 10

Euro Breakup…very painful indeed

The reasons why the Euro is a failing concept have certainly been well documented and spoken about. Basically, without a fiscal union, monetary policy and a single currency are instruments that are too blunt to aid struggling countries when other countries are experiencing different levels of economic growth and/or inflation across Europe.

For example, the German economy, which is performing better than Spain, should have a stronger currency whilst Spain should have a weak currency given its struggles. But what we have is a Euro that is stuck in the middle. Given Spain’s prices are above that of Germany’s, because there is no fiscal union, all Spain has left to be competitive is deflation which is disastrous for its economy (deflation means noone spends today because it is cheaper tomorrow).

Because of this failure of the Euro, the latest talk is breaking up the Euro. Back in September, UBS Economics wrote a paper, “Euro break-up – the consequences”,  analysing the costs of a single country a leaving the Euro and what an ugly result it is. (I unfortunately don’t have a link).

In summary, their estimated costs of a weak country, such as Greece, leaving the Euro was around EUR9500 to EURO11500 per person which is approximately 40% to 50% of GDP in the first year and the following years would cost around EUR3000 to EUR4000 per person…expensive stuff. For a strong country, like Germany, the costs are around 20% to 25% of GDP in the first years and 10% to 15% of GDP  in subsequent years…ouch.

The main reasons for the costs of Greek departure relate to the costs associated with sovereign default plus widespread banking and corporate default. Based on sovereign defaults in the past, currency is expected to depreciate by at least 50% to 60% and it is also expected that departure from the Euro would result in tariffs being imposed on Greek exports so a lower currency won’t automatically translate into competitiveness.

For a German departure, the costs are mostly associated with the reduction in export competitiveness which is bound to be exacerbated by increased political tensions, banks may have an issue on their balance sheet because their current assets and liabilities are in Euro and changing some of the parts into a new appreciating currency may dilute the value of assets and therefore bank recapitalisation may be necessary and costly.

Another part of the UBS paper that is interesting and not widely reported is the fact there is no “provision in the relevant European treaties for a country to exit the Euro…or expelled from the Euro”.  mmm … this is a legal scenario that may not be resolved overnight but perhaps why they have started working on it now.

Finally, the political cost of exiting the Euro whether strong or weak country is likely to be high. As UBS say, “the break-up of a monetary union is a very rare event” and “extremly unusual” for a paper currency union. The break up of Czechoslovakia and its monetary system resulted in social unrest and sealing of the borders.

Overall break up of the Euro is going to be a very expensive exercise no matter what and the final outcome is absolutely unknown. In the opinion of UBS, “the only way to hedge against a Euro break-up scenario is to own no Euro assets at all”.

 

Nov 07

My day at the Portfolio Construction Academy

Last Friday I attended a day long program with around 80 researchers, financial advisers, and other financial professionals as part of a 5 day portfolio construction program run by Graham Rich over a 12 month period. Friday’s program was divided into three parts…

  1. Investment Fables
  2. Asset Allocation using Scenario Modelling
  3. Greece

Each part went for around two and a half hours each and was mostly a fairly robust discussion or debate across each topic within small groups of 6 people or the forum as a whole.

Investment Fables was a completely appropriate introduction and reminded us all how vulnerable we all can be to a good investment story. This session was hosted by Professor Jack Gray, a self confessed ‘value’ investor with an enormous amount of experience who I could spend days on end listening to…a wonderful thinker and someone everyone could learn from. We explored many investment fables (or should I say myths) across asset classes as well as economics and investing itself. A couple of examples include, “buying stocks with low PE win out”, and “stocks always outperform in the long run”.

My main take-out from this session was how fallible we all are to the investment story and of course we all know that when it comes to investing you can always find a counter-example to the investment story…. If you are a ‘value’ investor there have always been long periods when ‘value’ investing has underperformed and same goes for the belief that ‘stocks always outperform’…personally I always look to Japan as a counter-example for many stock-related myths. Pretty obvious stuff but nonetheless an excellent reminder for perspective.

Next topic was Scenario modelling and this was hosted by the Asset Allocator, Tim Farrelly and Paul Scully. Scenario Modelling is a technique that on its surface is a relatively simple and logical approach to developing an asset allocation that reflects one’s belief. The main risk I see with it is, like with any mathematical model, garbage-in means garbage-out.

I believe one of the main users of this approach is Dr Susan Gosling of MLC. The approach basically involves the design of a number of economic scenarios that the future may bring and apply ideal asset allocations to each scenario followed by the application of probabilities of each scenario occurring. For example, we may believe one scenario for the future is that the Greece debacle may explode, the Euro experiment finishes, contagion results in the default of not just Greece, but Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain and a collapse of the global financial system as well as a severe global depression. The ideal asset allocation one may apply to this scenario is one that primarily consists of government bonds (Australian and US???), very few equities and perhaps a reasonable amount of cash (assuming the local banks don’t collapse also). A probability associated with this scenario may be 10%. Scenario 2 is developed, it may be early recovery which entails a high equities allocation and not much in the way of bonds, and the probability assigned may be 15% etc. The final asset allocation is the sum of the probabilities by the asset allocation for each scenario.

Whilst I don’t mind this approach for the institutional investor or even personal investor, I see a difficult application in the retail financial advisory world. This approach requires constant updating as new information enters the market, and would create quite a moving feast for the asset allocation, let alone the time required for the ongoing application. Whilst I do believe scenario modelling is much more likely to yield better results than a static asset allocation, the complexity of implementation across many advisers and their clients means the risks associated with it from an AFSL perspective may outweigh the benefits. I get the impression most of the delegates were mostly concerned with implementation in a retail setting.

The final topic of the day was Greece. Graham Rich brought along two guest speakers from European Banks, Barclays and UBS, to provide the audience with their perspectives on what the future holds for the European economies and markets. Their virtual blind faith (well, a slight exaggeration) in trusting the solution with the current politicians and bureaucrats was a little too optimistic for me. Despite that, the widely agreed expectations were that equity markets will continue to be volatile, Greece will ultimately default, and that markets may get worse before they get better.

The most poignant comment of the day was early on when Graham Rich mentioned that he could not recall a time that politicians have played a bigger part in the outcome of financial markets than they do today. Lets face it, it is up to politicians, with their various agendas, to solve the European Sovereign Crisis and it is up to the politicians to implement fiscal policy to generate more jobs in the US given Monetary policy is out of ammunition. Given this situation it is very difficult for any investor to happily embrace the risk of the equity markets so for most the best decision will be to sit on the sidelines until there is light at the end of the tunnel. We all know that this means significant upside in the market will be missed but that is an opportunity cost I believe many are prepared to make.

Anyway, overall it was a worthy day with some excellent debate and comment. I will be attending their markets summit and Day 2 of the Academy in February when the debate will centre on whether Cash is still King!

Nov 03

Australian Government Bond Yields…more rate cuts to come?

Source: RBA

In just 3 business days the yield curve has dropped down to where it was at the end of September where markets had experienced eight weeks of gloom and doom. Mind you, a lot happened in the three days to the end of yesterday…including the Greek’s putting significant doubt in the Euro rescue package, sharemarkets subsequently plummeting, and our Reserve Bank dropping their cash rates by 25bps.

According to the ASX’s Target Rate Tracker the market is placing the probability of another rate cut in December at 100%. The above yield curve certainly agress with that sentiment and with 5 month bonds trading around 4.1% the market is also saying there’ll be at least 75bps in cuts through to April.

Obviously, this all means that inflaiton is a non-issue for the Reserve Bank and the focus is on the local economy whose sentiment is being driven by the Euro Sovereign concerns. Whilst I usually go with market expectations regarding RBA activity I didn’t when incorrectly predicting last week’s RBA decision. Europe still has a long long way to go so the current theme of sharemarket volatility will undoubtedly continue. Term Deposits are the overweight position for me.

Oct 29

Term Deposit Premium very high again

Source: Reserve Bank of Australia

The above chart shows the premium banks are paying for their 3 year term deposits compared to 3 year Australian Government bonds from 1992 to the end of September 2011. Since hitting its aboslute high around the start of 2010 and peaking again around July 2010, term deposits are paying aound 2% more than government bonds once again (although I acknowledge the data is a few weeks old). With the Australian government still providing a guarantee on bank deposits up to values of $200,000 from February 2012 onwards (its currently $1m), term deposits are certainly looking quite attractive for the retail investor.

Unfortunately bond funds can’t quite take advantage of these good rates. This is because banks, building societies, and credit unions aren’t interested in accepting massive sums from institutional investors knowing there is a high probability that at maturity the institutional investor won’t reinvest. This is a risk to the financial institution’s balance sheet which they look to reduce and do so by limiting the level of institutional investment and paying lower rates compared to retail investors. Retail investor money is wonderfully sticky compared to a large institution.

Oct 29

Australian Government Bond Yields…small improvement

The last month has shown a bit of a bounce-back in the sharemarkets but as the above yield curve indicates, so far its more of a dead cat bounce and there’s a long way to go. The yield curve is still negatively sloping to beyond two years indicating the market is expecting a few rate rise drops by the Reserve Bank in the months/years to come.  I tend to think the Reserve Bank will stay on hold once again on Tuesday simply because I think they’d rather wait and see how this latest Euro rescue package pans out. The early signs are positive but there are still a few concerns, notably the yields on Italian bonds are still very high (see below) and if they stay high then that spells trouble for Europe as Italy is the biggest debt holder in Europe and the third biggest in the world (behind Japan and USA) and they can’t be bailed out.

Italian 10 Year Bonds – 28 Oct 2011

Source: Bloomberg

Anyway, there’s a long long way to go before Europe is aywhere near out of trouble and the details of their latest plan aren’t even finalised so I imagine the Australian bond market will be tentative for some time yet and equity markets will continue their high volatility.

Oct 29

Australian Equities Fund Manager Style over time

A couple of weeks ago I did a post showing Fama French 3 Factor analysis on some of the leading Australian Equities fund managers. The analysis covered returns from June 2003 to September 2011 so it obviously covered a mixture of markets…bull bear and sideways. I just completed the same analysis but this time I divided the data into three distinct markets…

  1. Bull Market from 2003 to the end of October 2007
  2. Global Financial Crisis bear market from the end of October 2007 to its bottom at the end of February 2009
  3. The GFC recovery since the end of February 2009 to September 2011

The updated results are…

 

Data Source: van Eyk, Morningstar

My factor descriptions are…

  • Annualised Alpha is effectively the skill the manager brings after all factors are considered…e.g. it includes their market timing skills
  • Market Beta – represents the fund’s volatility relative to the market’s. So a Market Beta of 1 means the fund’s performance moves in sync with the market’s
  • HML – this factor is long MSCI Australia Growth and short MSCI Australia Value…so if the results are positive then chances are the fund is a “Growth” fund and “Value” is negative
  • SMB – this factor is Long Small Caps and Short the ASX200…therefore a positive result shows a small cap bias relative to the market

I haven’t produced the statistical significance of each factor but I have highlighted the significant results for the HML factor. These results indicate some consistency of style across at least 2 of the 3 markets from DFA Australian Value and Investor’s Mutual (IML) which are both value biased; BT, Fidelity, and Ausbil which are each growth biased; and Tyndall, Perpetual, and DFA Large Cap which don’t appear to be either value or growth biased although Tyndall has a growth bias in the bull market preceding the GFC.

I’m not so sure Perpetual and Tyndall will agree with me on that given they both state they are value managers but the results are the results. Both of these managers also appear to have a greater small cap bias than all others (except DFA Aust Value) so I guess that is where their focus has been. Whilst they may claim to be “value” managers they appear to be a little more focused in small cap land than their competitors…something to keep in mind when considering their portfolio inclusion.

Unsurprisingly all managers shows high market betas, which is a typical characteristic of well diversified long only managers so when the market goes down (or up) so too do these funds.

In terms of what combinations may be best…its looking like Fidelity combined with either IML or DFA Aust Value.

Oct 17

SPIVA Results – Active Managers still struggling

I’m quite late in reporting the recent performance of fund managers from my favourite performance report, Standard and Poor’s SPIVA. For those that don’t know the reason why this is my favourite report on fund manager performance is that it considers survivorship. It does this by examining all fund managers at the start of the reporting period, as opposed to the Mercer, Morningstar, and other performance surveys who look at performance of the fund managers who are still around at the end of the reporting period, which excludes managers who have blown up, experienced high levels of redemptions, or failed to attract sufficient funds and closed.

Anyway, the table above shows the proportion of fund managers who have failed to outperform standard benchmarks of their respective asset class.

Over the 12 months to 30 June 2011, once again only small cap Australian equity managers have more than 50% of managers outperforming their index.

The most interesting result is that more than 50% of both Australian Equity General and A-REIT managers have outperformed over the last 3 years. Unfortunately for them the 5 year results are quite dismal with more than 70% and 60% respectively underperforming their respective index.

As expected, Australian bond managers have the most trouble outperforming the UBS Composite index and despite the yield curve changing shape numerous time  the past 5 years and the same with credit spreads, active managers have consistently struggled.

Oct 14

Australian Equity Manager’s Investment Style…maybe not all true to label

Its been a little while since I wrote anything on managed fnds. Yesterday I attended a series of presentations at Griffith University whereby undergrad students presented results of their previous few months working in financial services. Some of the results were very interesting including how many global fund managers demonstrated a different investment style than they claimed. So with this inspiration this afternoon I quickly whipped up a bit of Fama French 3 factor analysis of some of the more popular funds in Australia and my results are in the table below.

The data used in this analysis is monthly data from June 2003 to September 2011, so 99 months in total. Only Tyndall and Dimensional’s Large Cap fund failed to generate any risk-adjusted alpha. As expected the Market Beta is high for all funds, less so for Investors Mutual (IML) with a market beta of 0.77 (might be a little more flexibiility in their mandate I suspect).

HML is a factor which is effectively buying the growth index and shorting the value index, hence if the beta is negative it reflects the manager’s value bias and if positive, growth bias. The interesting results with regards to HML are…

  • Tyndall claims to be a value manager but shows an insignificant value bias
  • Dimensional Aust Value is strongly value biased as you would expect from a Fama French influenced manager as is Investors’ Mutual…both true to style
  • Fidelity, BT and Ausbil each have a growth bias and this is not surprising based on their stated styles
  • Perpetual, however show a significant bias to growth despite claiming to be a value manager…perhaps its tought to stick to your style when your so big…not sure

The final factor, SMB, is the equivalent of buying the MSCI Small Cap index and shorting the market which is large cap biased. The results show that all managers extract some of their return from the small cap space with Dimensional, unsurprisingly, showing the strongest bias to small caps.

So, this 8 year analysis shows Tyndall and Perpetual may be a little suspect with regards to their style. From a portfolio construction perspective, with their strong levels of skill and relative opposite styles it looks like combining Fidelity Australian  and Dimensional Australian Value funds may be a combination worthy of consideration.

My disclaimer…past returns do not equal future returns so everything I just wrote could turn out to be completely wrong in the future…so don’t act on this analysis without seeking professional advice!!!

 

Oct 10

Asset Allocation that considers Asset Weighted Returns

My earlier posts on asset-weighted returns got me thinking about how to apply this thinking throughout the working life of a superannuation member so I did this little exercise. I know this has probably been done to death by the lifecycle investment gurus out there but I thought I’d see for myself what I would come up with…its a little dodgy but approximately ok.

Anyway, I thought I’d start with an 18 year old with no super, earning $20,000pa. Obviously 9% must be contributed to super under Australian law, and I also assumed his/her income would grow at 4%pa which is roughly in line with average growth rates in AWOTE (Average Weekly Ordinary Times Earnings…I think). I also assumed that the superannuation investment would grow at an annual rate of 7%pa after tax, which is obviously well above the risk free rate but over a working life of more than 40 years I’d like to think is achievable for a ‘balanced’ investment across multiple asset classes.

A summary of these simplistic results are in table 1 below…

Table 1

Now, obviously in the real world one’s income will fluctuate, therefore so will superannuation contributions, and investment returns will also fluctuate (don’t I know it!!). But, overall the outcomes from Table 1 don’t look too unreasonable.

Step 2 for me in this exercise is to consider ‘Value at Risk’ or VaR. Whilst VaR is a concept that has been blasted in recent times thanks to its mis-applicaton leading up to the GFC, its still not a bad way of looking at downside risk potential.

Using various risk and return assumptions, across generic portfolios ranging from 0% risky assets to 100% risky assets, I then calculated VaR for each portfolio…my definition is that the portfolio has a 1 in 40 chance of returning lower than the VaR result. For example, for a 70% risky asset portfolio I calculated it has a 1 in 40 chance of achieving a return worse than -10.5% in any one year and for a 30% risky portfolio a 1 in 40 chance of returning worse than -3.8%…you may think I’m being a little optimistic but sobeit they’re not too far off.

Using this information I then made the assumption that using the outcomes from Table 1 for each year from age 18 to 65, I do not wish to have more than $40,000 at risk (that is a 1 in 40 chance of losing more than $40,000).

Now I know I should have used some optimisation techniques with regards to my inputs but in keeping things simple I kept my balance figures from Table 1. Using my calculated VaR results for each portfolio, Chart 1 shows what the maximum exposure to risky assets needs to be throughout my example’s working life.

Chart 1

 As can be seen this chart has a very similar glide path that many of the lifecycle gurus spruik. Maximum exposure to risky assets does not start to decline until around age 47 and at age 65 the maximum exposure to risky assets is around 35%.

These outcomes can easily be adjusted on an individual basis depending on risk/return expectations, super contributions, as well as how much super balance one wants to put at risk over time. But these results use my rough estimates.

We all experience asset weighted returns…i.e. it hurts more when we lose more money…so…bottom line…if we consider asset-weighted returns when designing asset allocation for a superannuation member the evidence supports a lifecycle/glidepath approach to investing superannuation.

Good to see the MySuper legislation considering the lifecycle approach.

 

Oct 07

Australian Government Bond Yield Curve…not much change

I don’t really have too much to say on this as nothing has really changed too significantly…the market is expecting interest rate cuts with an economy influenced by overseas events. The uncertainty in markets remains huge and its difficult to feel bullish on sharemarkets or the global economy and the downside risks clearly remain as nothing is resolved. Whilst we’ve had a couple of very big up days in the sharemarket there’s little strong evidence at this point in time to support its continuation (valuation doesn’t quite cut it) so I’m sure there’ll be some sharp down days soon. Volatility to continue and look out for bad Chinese data.

Older posts «

» Newer posts