Nov 14

Does higher non-market risk produce higher alpha?…and the possible introduction of the Furey Ratio


There’s a widely held belief that to create alpha (i.e. positive returns after adjusting for risk…let’s say market risk), a manager needs to make meaningful bets away from the market. That is, stop being a “benchmark hugger”, concentrate the portfolio with best ideas, and/or move the portfolio holdings away from the benchmark and possibly be more absolute-return oriented. We have all seen numerous strategies that meet these criteria, have generated strong alpha, but is this a reality or it is a belief that is lacking in evidence, save a handful of strategies that just so happen to tell us so. This article seeks to provide some clues to whether accepting greater non-market risk does produce higher alpha.

Non-market risk…and a few technical bits

Firstly, let’s define non-market risk?

Possibly the most frequently used measure is tracking error (which is the standard deviation of the difference between a portfolio’s returns and its benchmark). Whilst tracking error is a good measure of non-market risk, it can be a little misleading in the example of a geared index fund as there is absolute are no bets away from the market due to being an index fund, but the gearing produces a high tracking error. Therefore I believe tracking error creates a potentially inaccurate bias when it comes to comparing non-market risk to alpha generation.

A more recent popular statistic is active share which describes the percentage of holdings that are different to a market benchmark. A portfolio with a high active share suggests a large difference from the benchmark. Because this statistic is a holdings based measure it is quite difficult to measure on a regular basis. Secondly it is also possible to have a portfolio with a high active share but is highly correlated with the market benchmark suggesting that holdings differences do not necessarily translate into performance differences.

A preferred measure of non-market risk is what some may also call idiosyncratic risk. Idiosyncratic risk is similar to tracking error but is adjusted for exposure to market risk (i.e. market beta) and is defined as the proportion of a total portfolio’s risk due to non-market bets. To be specific, it is (1-R²), where R² is the goodness of fit of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to the portfolio in question … CAPM is represented by Equation 1 below. A second advantage of using idiosyncratic risk is that Equation 1 is also used to calculate Alpha…so a win-win.

So the statistic this paper places most emphasis on is… α/(1-R²)

…and after checking numerous textbooks, I cannot find a name for it, so for this paper will declare it the “Furey Ratio” until someone corrects me. The Furey Ratio is similar to the Information Ratio (which is the ratio of excess benchmark return divided by the portfolio tracking error) but unlike the Information Ratio, the Furey Ratio adjusts for different levels of market risk. So the Furey Ratio is another measure of risk-adjusted return and is Alpha per unit of Idiosyncratic Risk. What we really want to see in an active manager is a high Furey Ratio, meaning they are getting big bang for their non-market risky buck!

CAPM Equation

Now to the analysis…and a few more technical bits

The analysis plan is to assess whether managers are more likely to produce higher risk-adjusted alpha with greater idiosyncratic risk … so to do this we will test the statistical significance of the Furey ratio, α/(1-R2), from a sample of manager returns.

Data Selection

The manager returns uses performance from two groups of strategies…

  1. Global Equities (Sample size = 121)
  2. Australian Equities (Sample size = 226)

…which are the two largest equity asset classes in the Australian investment landscape.

Monthly performance from September 2010 to September 2015 is used and acquired from Morningstar Direct. Duplicated strategies, where the only difference is fee structure, are removed.

The 5 year time-frame to the end of Sep 2015 has been chosen for the following reasons…

  • 5 years produces sufficient numbers of both monthly performance (i.e. 60) and number of available strategies
  • It is after the Global Financial Crisis period of 2008/09, i.e. from Sep 2010
  • It balances the survivorship bias that comes with using a longer time-frame with a reasonable overall sample size…i.e. survivorship bias is a real issue if considering the GFC period as only the better managers survived through to 2015 from before the GFC period

Aside from these reasons, 5 years is still a somewhat arbitrary time period (i.e. it probably makes little difference compared to 5 years and 2 months of data).

Let’s start with Global Equities…

Chart 1 shows CAPM Alpha vs CAPM Idiosyncratic risk over 5 years to end of September 2015 for the 121 Global Equity Managers taken from Morningstar Direct database. All managers chosen have a minimum 5 year track record, and are classified by Morningstar as Global Equities managers.

On the positive side for global equity active managers the regression line in chart 1 slopes upwards suggesting there is a chance that with greater non-benchmark risk comes from higher alpha (CAPM Alpha). This trend demonstrates a positive Furey Ratio but unfortunately, the P-value of 0.153793 of the trend line suggests it is not significantly different from zero at the usual required minimum significance levels (i.e. 0.05)… so weak evidence that higher alpha is not strongly correlated with greater non-benchmark risks.

Chart 1 – CAPM Alpha vs Idiosyncratic Risk – Global Equity Managers (Sep 2010 to Sep 2015)

CAPM Alpha vs Idiosyncratic Risk – Global Equity Managers

Source: Delta Research & Advisory

A simple observation from Chart 1 is that there is significant clustering of values at the lower end of the x-axis and a fanning out of alpha levels as Idiosyncratic risk increases. This suggests there may be a reasonable argument that regression analysis of this data may be somewhat inappropriate.  So to counteract this issue, the following analysis divides the above CAPM Idiosyncratic risk measure into 5 quintiles.

Chart 2 – CAPM Alpha vs Quintiles of Idiosyncratic Risk – Global Equity Managers (Sep 2010 to Sep 2015)

CAPM Alpha vs Quintiles of Idiosyncratic Risk - Global Equity Managers

Source: Delta Research & Advisory

Once again, there are positive signs as there is higher Alpha for the two higher quintiles of Idiosyncratic Risk. However, and unfortunately for active managers, the higher values are not statistically different…please refer the following Hypothesis Test between quintiles 3 and 5 (which have the largest difference).

Hypothesis Test 1

Source: Delta Research & Advisory

So stopping the analysis of Global Equities strategies there, so far there is little evidence to suggest a statistically significant and positive Furey Ratio amongst the Australian market of Global Equities managers over the last 5 years … therefore suggesting higher idiosyncratic risk probably hasn’t produced higher alpha.

…lets move on to Australian Equities strategies

Similar to Global Equities strategies chosen, a sample of Australian Equity managers have been chosen from the Morningstar Direct database, duplicated strategies have been eliminated, and 5 years of monthly performance between September 2010 and September 2015 used for the following analysis.

Chart 3 shows that once again there is the spread of Alpha as Idiosyncratic risk increases and the slope of the line (i.e. Furey Ratio) increases. Also similarly, the Furey Ratio is not significantly different from zero at the 5% level (P-value = 0.07215 which is greater than 0.05), also indicating this chart does not suggest greater alpha from higher levels of idiosyncratic risk…at least using statistical tests.

Chart 3 – CAPM Alpha vs Idiosyncratic Risk – Australian Equity Managers (Sep 2010 to Sep 2015)

CAPM Alpha vs Idiosyncratic Risk – Australian Equity Managers

Source: Delta Research & Advisory

Like Global Equities there is a reasonable argument that the regression analysis is not appropriate due to the larger variance of Alpha as Idiosyncratic risk increases so similar group analysis is applied by dividing Idiosyncratic Risk into quintiles and the results are shown in Chart 4.

This time there is a statistically significant difference between the Alpha of those managers at the 4th quintile and those at both the first and second quintile…but not between the others (you’ll have to trust me on this)…please refer following Hypothesis Testing results.

Chart 4 – CAPM Alpha vs Quintiles of Idiosyncratic Risk – Australian Equities Managers (Sep 2010 to Sep 2015)

CAPM Alpha vs Quintiles of Idiosyncratic Risk - Australian Equity Managers

Source: Delta Research & Advisory

Hypothesis Test 2

Source: Delta Research & Advisory

Hypothesis Test 3

Source: Delta Research & Advisory

…Stretching the analysis just that little bit further…

Observing Chart 4, it does appear to show two distinct groups where quintiles 1 and 2 have Alpha results around 0 whilst quintiles 3 to 5 have CAPM Alpha of more than 1% on average…which I’m sure many active managers would be pleased about. Combining the quintiles into these 2 groups yields the following results for CAPM Alpha…

Chart 5 – CAPM Alpha vs Quintiles 1 & 2 and Quintiles 3 to 5 of Idiosyncratic Risk – Australian Equities Managers (Sep 2010 to Sep 2015)

Alpha by 2 Idiosyncratic Risk groups - Aust Equities

Source: Delta Research & Advisory

…and the difference in means are statistically significant given the Hypothesis rejection below…

Hypothesis Test 4

Source: Delta Research & Advisory

So, if I may say that after some potential data mining, there may be some evidence that greater idiosyncratic risk relates to higher levels of alpha (or at the risk of being egotistical, a higher Furey Ratio) among Australian equities managers.

For those interested, the level of Idiosyncratic Risk that intercepts between Quintiles 2 and 3 is only 5.82% (which is around the borderline of the clustering in Chart 3)… meaning if the market, as defined by MSCI Australia GR, explains more than 94.18% (i.e. 1 – 0.0582) of an Australian equity manager’s performance volatility, then this may decrease the chances of generating positive alpha and vice versa.


Over the 5 years to September 2015, the evidence within this paper is possibly weaker than many would expect and shows there is little to no relationship between managers generating alpha and idiosyncratic risk…particularly for Global Equities strategies.

There is some evidence that greater idiosyncratic risk has led to higher alpha amongst Australian Equities strategies although it does not appear to be a linear relationship. However, the result over the last 5 years does show that Australian equities managers have, on average, produced a significantly higher alpha if their non-benchmark risk is greater than around 5.8%.

So for Australian equities managers, the optimistic conclusion (so far) is that there are two groups…the first group is the much-maligned benchmark huggers (with idiosyncratic risk less than 5.8%) who have struggled to produce any alpha at all on average; and the second group with idiosyncratic risk that is higher than 5.8% which has produced a significantly higher alpha of 1.7%pa over the 5 years to September 2015. This result doesn’t mean the higher the idiosyncratic risk the higher the alpha (because of the lack of linear relationship) but it is some evidence that a higher non-benchmark risk does increase the chances of positive alpha…so the jury is still out but benchmark huggers should beware.    Send article as PDF   

Nov 07

The importance of asset allocation in Australia…BHB revisited

We’ve all seen various developments in product design from hedge funds to long/short to real return approaches, and then there’s the increased focus on tactical and dynamic asset allocation. You would expect all of this to lead to different drivers of portfolio risk…i.e. away from traditional asset class drivers to market timing, investment selection, and more exotic asset allocations.

So 30 years ago, Brinson, Hood, and Beebower demonstrated that more than 90% of a group of more than 90 US Pension fund portfolio volatility was due to the asset allocation decision…so has this changed or is it any different in Australia? To find out, plus a little more in terms of the importance of active management … click here to download my paper on the importance of asset allocation in Australia.

Alternatively…please click here for the same article at Portfolio Construction Forum

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Sep 20

A widely accepted portfolio construction flaw

The typical approach to portfolio construction in the world of financial planning is a 2-step process (of course, this is after the desired risk and return characteristics are settled). The first step is setting asset allocation and the second is investment selection where most of the industry chooses to select from a variety of managed fund strategies.

Whilst there may be many different outcomes across the industry with respect to the asset allocation decision, estimates of return and/or risk for a variety of asset classes are considered before settling on the recommended result … whether it be designed around risk profiles, return objectives, or allocation of risk. Unfortunately it is the second step of portfolio construction. i.e. the investment selection, where a major flaw exists across the industry and the final portfolio may introduce greater risks than realised.

Part of the problem is that the 2 steps are approached in an independent way. Firstly, the asset allocation decision is a market beta decision…that means the allocation is decided according to expectation of the performance of each particular asset class over a particular time period. These performance expectations are based around benchmarks such as S&P/ASX 200, MSCI World for shares, and perhaps Bloomberg Ausbond Composite (formerly UBS Composite) and Barlcays Global Aggregate for bonds, amongst others. So if a particular asset allocation places 30% with Australian shares, then the expectation is that the final portfolio will reflect that 30% allocation.

Where the portfolio construction flaw exists, is that the investment selection may resemble nothing like the asset class it is supposed to represent. For example, within an Equities allocation there may be managers chosen that invest within the Equities asset class but take positions such that the return outcome is completely unrelated to the market the asset allocation decision is based around. Some of these strategies may be variable beta, market neutral, or with specific geographic exposures such as Emerging Markets or as extreme as India or China. Whilst there may be potential return merit in the chosen strategies because the decision is independent to the asset allocation, the investor experience may be very different than expected.

The following chart, whilst intentionally ridiculously messy, shows the 3 year rolling market beta over the last 11 years for more than 250 Australian equities managers…and they are all long only or long biased strategies. What is shows is that whilst the average beta of all strategies is 1 (you may be able to see the average line on the far left or right of the chart) and what a typical investor would expect, the variation in beta, or market exposure, of this strategy investment universe is enormous…it ranges from 0.2 to 1.8.

Market Beta (S&P/ASX 200 TR) exposure of Australian Share funds … each dot point is rolling 3 year average

Australian Shares Manager Market - Beta

Source: Delta Research & Advisory

Believe it or not, the fund with the 1.8 beta is not a geared share fund (as would normally be the case) but is in fact a long only sector specific strategy, whilst the strategy with the 0.2 beta is a deep value long only strategy that uses cash when it doesn’t see opportunities. These types of strategies are quite frequently selected as part of an Australian shares asset allocation although their performance history suggests they are either much riskier than the market like a geared share fund (beta = 1.8) or provide very little exposure at all (beta = 0.2). So if a portfolio constructor is looking to choose investments that reflect an asset allocation these extreme strategies are very poor selections.

So what to do? To be true to an asset allocation requires consideration of the likely market beta of a strategy…and strategies with market betas consistently between 0.8 and 1.2 are possibly best as choosing strategies outside of this range increases risks of significant underperformance and heavy reliance on a strategy generating large alpha…and alpha is not always easy to come by. We know that past performance rarely equates to future performance but the same is not the case of a strategy’s beta as a very high proportion of strategies do show consistent betas (which are often mandate determined).

It is expected that many portfolio constructors, particularly the objective-driven believers, will not like or appreciate the “beta 1” approach to strategy selection and in the context of their investment philosophy that is fair enough. As mentioned above, the root cause of this portfolio construction flaw is that the asset allocation decision is independent to the investment selection decision.

So the true solution of this portfolio construction dilemma may be that there is no 2 step process to portfolio construction and the asset allocation and investment decision is performed simultaneously. Earlier in the year there was a widely held belief (and perhaps still true today) that all major asset classes are expensive. If this is the belief then beta of 1 may be a poor investment decision and movements away from market risk and towards smart beta and/or alpha potential is best. Either way, understanding the beta of the investment selection is an important part of the portfolio construction decision and one that will aid in aligning with the true desired portfolio outcomes and beliefs.

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Aug 26

Real Return funds…lacking real-ity?

What a fascinating investment world its been over the past few months. We’ve had concerns about Greece exiting the Euro, commodity price crashes, a Chinese sharemarket crash and now some of the biggest developed economy sharemarket declines since the dark days of the GFC. Volatility has been somewhat benign for a long time thanks to QE3 and the money printing out of Japan and Europe but its come back with a vengeance.

One of the more recent trends in the product landscape resulting from the GFC has been objective based investing…most notably Real Return funds. The story goes that investors are looking for a decent return above inflation and don’t really want exposure to the nasty volatility of sharemarkets as this market exposure didn’t appear too aligned with their true investment goals….so these objective-based investments appeared (or at least most of them did) following the GFC and have been quite popular.

Today (and pretty much most of recent times), these products have a bit of a problem…unfortunately these products have dug a hole for themselves and will probably struggle to get out. The problem is they are real return plus “too much”….and it has turned them into investments that not only will struggle to meet their objectives, but have landed their investors back where they came from…that is, exposures that carried too much risk.

The most popular objective (at least that I’ve noticed) of Real Return funds is CPI + 5%. A few years ago, this wasn’t perceived as too big a problem….Cash rates during 2011 and 2012 were in the mid 4%s, term deposits were paying attractive premiums (150bps+) over government bond yields, as too were investment grade bonds (BBB rated bonds were 200-300 bps of government bonds) so with an expected CPI at the RBA target mid-point of 2.5%…scrambling for a few extra basis points didn’t require massive risk taking and a diversified portfolio of defensive and risky investments could do the trick.

Fast forward to today and its a completely different story…

  • RBA Cash rates are at 2%…below expected inflation…and priced to go lower
  • Government bond yields are yielding between 1.8% (for short term) and 3.2% (if you want 15+ year terms)
  • BBB rated bonds have premiums at less than 2% over government bonds with total yields for 3-5 securities at less than 4%

…meaning these traditional defensive securities are quite debilitating to any portfolio looking to achieve CPI + 5%. This can only mean that in order to achieve the desired objective requires loading up on risk and a fair bit of it. Risk from sharemarkets, junk bonds, and almost by default…illiquidity.

None of this should have come as too big a surprise when you consider the last 50 years…equity returns in Australia and Globally have produced real returns of only a little more than 5%…pretty much equaling these Real Return objectives, whilst bonds and cash have understandably fallen well short. So portfolios containing not much other than equities (& other risky assets) should have been expected.

So today, we are clearly in a position where these Real Return funds (or at least those with +5% real targets) require significant levels of risky assets to achieve objectives, and waddayaknow…we have badly behaving sharemarkets. Hopefully this bad behaviour is short-lived but either way, I have to wonder how these objective-focused or real-return investors will react when they discover, once again, their objectives are struggling to be met and/or they are carrying uncomfortable levels of risky assets. Unfortunately the main problem real return investors have failed to grasp is that there aren’t too many asset classes that actually provide real returns of a +5% magnitude…sure they might outperform inflation by 5% over long periods of time, but the returns are typically not highly correlated to inflation so real returns is quite the misnomer. Oh yeah…and inflation linked bonds don’t provide anything like CPI + 5%.

So the bottom line… real return investing isn’t too real at all with big targets like CPI + 5%…it is an objective that is not strongly linked to the reality of investment markets so prepare for another investment approach aligned with disappointment.

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Feb 21

A few simple thoughts on a few not so simple markets

Following are my recent thoughts around markets with many charts to support these views. These views are far from complete but do represent a reasonable summary at this point in time.

Income Assets

Aust Government Bond Yield Curve - 19 Feb 2015 - Version 2


Source: RBA, Delta Research & Advisory

  • The above left chart suggests the market believes the cash rate is heading towards 1.5% to 1.75% and there is likely to be continued weakening of the Australian economy
  • With cash rates currently at 2.25%, cash does appear to be slightly better value than conservative bonds where the yield is less than 2% around 4 to 5 year terms.

Global Bonds - Feb 2015

Source: RBA

  • Major global bond yields continue to trade near record lows with little sign of inflation or rising interest rates anywhere
  • Despite that, there is talk of an increasing cash rate in the US and too much too soon is likely to put significant strain on the US economy and therefore equity market also.

Credit Spreads - Feb 2015

Source: RBA

  • With BBB spreads only around 180 basis points above government bonds, then the expected return of the Australian Fixed interest market (~UBS Composite) over the next 3 to 5 years is only around 3%pa.
  • These spreads do represent slight value as traditional default rates are below these spreads suggesting a higher risk-adjusted return can be had if Australian credit is held for the long term
  • US Credit spreads appear to be at similar values to Australian credit also suggesting similar value.
  • However, a significant number of high yield corporates are energy companies and the collapse in oil prices (see below) do make the high yield sector somewhat riskier than usual

Oil Price 1

Source: Morningstar Direct

  • Oil’s recent price collapse is the second biggest over the last 30 years

Oil Price 2


Source: Morningstar Direct

  • Prefer Cash over Australian Bonds over Global Bonds but investment grade credit also has marginal appeal.
  • So overall preferred strategy is short duration, investment grade credit


  • As suggested above, Australian and major global economies continue to appear weak or fragile at best.
  • Forecast earning for Australian companies for 2015 and 2016 years have been in decline
  • Despite economic weakness everywhere, Australian sharemarket appears to be significantly better priced than global shares on a PE ratio basis by the biggest margin for over 10-12 yearsAustrlaian Earnings

Source: RBA

  • Supporting the lower valuation is also a superior dividend yield from Australian companies and when you add the “only available in Australia” franking credits, the simple view suggests much better value for Australian equities

Austrlaian Div and ToT

Source: RBA

  • However the key risk to the Australian market is the rapidly declining terms of trade lead by the decline of key export commodity prices which will flow into most aspects of the Australian economy.

Austrlaian Commodity Prices

Source: RBA

  • Other threats to the Australian market include a collapse in residential house prices which are at record highs in most cities, although are at threat should unemployment spike higher

 Australian Economic Risks

Source: RBA

  • Whilst Australian equities appear better value than global equities, Emerging Markets appear even better again with a PE Ratio significantly below global equities (13.4 vs 17.9). Other valuation metrics for Emerging Markets are also quite favourable including forward PE ratios, and price to book value.

EM Statistics


  • Emerging Markets equities have also performed quite poorly in recent years thanks to the slowdown in China which, like Australia, has been a dominant economic force.
  • The risks for investing in Emerging markets is the instability of their currencies which have been incredibly volatile over the last couple of years (since there was an original hint of the unwinding ofQE3).

EM Equity Perfroamcen

Source: Morningstar Direct

 Property & Infrastructure

Property & Infrastructure

Sources: ,

  • Australian property paying higher dividend yield by around 2% which is also around the carry received from hedging global property into Australian dollars
  • Price to Book value and forward PE suggests Australian property may be better value although return on equity has been lower which is most likely a reflection of the lower gearing levels in Australia
  • Greater diversification or less concentration in the Global Property market compared to the Australian market which is dominated by a few securities such as Westfield
  • The table below shows a current dividend yield of only 2.9% for developed infrastructure which is slightly lower than global property and a reflection of its recent strong performance
  • Value in all three sub-asset classes has diminished significantly
  • Current trend of chase for yield may assist these asset classes in a low interest rate environment but their value appears weak

Equity Styles

Value vs Growth

Value vs Growth - Feb 2015

Source: Morningstar Direct

  • Significantly stronger performance by Australian value over Australian growth during last 3 years…belief in mean reversion suggests a bias towards growth strategies
  • Very little difference between value and growth among global equities so preference remains value

Small vs Large

Small vs Large - Feb 2015

Source: Morningstar Direct

  • Similarly Australian smaller companies have significantly underperformed larger companies
  • Very little difference between large and small among global equities so given the high valuations a preference is to keep the typically more volatile small companies to a minimum    Send article as PDF   

Nov 13

Industry Super Funds, Transparency…and stretching the truth a little

One of the bigger frustrations for advisers is the lack of transparency of industry super funds. Advisers and researchers do not have deep access to their investment processes, often with little understanding as to what comprises an investment strategy beyond anything other than the asset allocation. As a result, in general advisers don’t recommend industry super funds as they struggle to satisfy the “know your product” part of their recommendations…there are exceptions and other reasons for recommending them, perhaps administrative efficiency, but advisers typically have concerns around the lack of transparency of investment risks.

Now not all Industry Super funds are completely lacking in transparency. For example Rest Super provide good detail of their long term historic performance as well as a list of investment managers that underlie each investment strategy/asset class…fantastic. This means for Rest Super we may be able to get some understanding of what risks may exist…a step in the right direction.

One of the prevalent asset class definitions among Industry Super funds is “Defensive Alternatives”…personally, I tend to think this term is an oxymoron. There is little doubt that alternative strategies can and do provide diversification benefits to a portfolio with the ability of increasing return potential whilst lowering portfolio risk. But on their own, I believe their alternative risks can rarely be relied on when you need them most…particularly when most alternatives are defined as Hedge funds, Private Equity, Commodities, or perhaps Property & Infrastructure.

One of the strategies that is disclosed as part of Rest Super’s “Defensive Alternatives” is Jubilee Absolute Return Trust. Now its possible that Rest have a special mandate with Jubilee such that this investment is defensive, but when you consider the following performance chart of Jubilee versus cash and the near 20% drawdown towards the end of 2008, I’m pretty confident many would have a big question mark of its defensive status…certainly it wasn’t negatively correlated with risky assets during the worst of the GFC…and isn’t negatively correlation to risky assets what you want from a defensive investment???

Jubilee Absolute Return Trust

Source: Morningstar Direct

Anyway, the key message is that you should never believe what an investment manager says and one person or firm’s definition of defensive may differ to someone else’s. The “Know your Product” requirement is an essential one for good financial advice and significant care must always be taken when providing advice on asset allocation alone. Of course, none of this means that the strategy won’t work moving forward…its just investing requires an understanding of risks and whether they are worth accepting.

For Rest Super, the “Defensive Alternatives” asset class as expected is not regarded as a growth asset class so their default Core strategy is self-classified as having 75% of growth asset instead of 84% if you include the 9% allocation of Defensive Alternatives…I’m sure most would agree 75% is quite aggressive, but 84% is a step up again…so Buyer Beware.

My personal hope is that one day, Industry Super funds will move to the levels of transparency that many of the larger retail managers have provided over the year. There is little doubt Industry Super funds do have high quality investment strategies worthy of recommendation by financial planners, but it is difficult to do so whilst there are doubts about “knowing the product”.

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Nov 08

Merton’s Retirement Income Views…correct but its not a product solution…its an advice solution!!!

Nobel laureate economist Robert Merton says David Murray’s Financial System Inquiry must fundamentally shift how Australia thinks about superannuation. He says the desire to maximise lump-sum balances at retirement is excessively risky; the focus should be on ensuring retirement income is enough to meet a desired standing of living.

Source: AFR – 6 Nov 2014 (Paywalled)

I completely agree with this paragraph…in fact, I would say its worse than that as my recent personal experience working with advisers suggests there is still a strong culture of short termism with the focus on maximising returns today as opposed to between now and retirement. However, despite my agreement with the problem, the solution is definitely not a product or super fund, as alluded to by Merton…

…too many super funds are failing to de-risk balances as employees approach retirement, exposing them to market volatility which could slash their retirement incomes.

…But given this Nobel Prize winning Economist is currently consulting to a product provider then this view is not surprising.

The only solution to this retirement income problem comes from high quality, ongoing, personalised, financial planning. A product can never be personalised and efficiently consider their investor’s needs because they are all different. Investors have different net assets, different savings abilities, different lifestyle costs, and different risk tolerances, so any product solution looking to optimise these issues across a cohort of thousands is kidding themselves…but there is still opportunity for improvement so good luck to Merton and his clients.

So if providing high quality personalised financial planning can make a difference, why aren’t they doing so? I think the opening paragraph still gives the primary clue in that the financial planning focus in accumulation is not focused on providing an adequate retirement income to meet a desired standard of living.

A desired standard of living can be calculated from a budget….its not hard but its rarely done. Taking the time to estimate a household budget can identify savings opportunities, insurance needs, and those non-discretionary expenses that are likely to endure into retirement…its a very powerful exercise which is too often left out of the financial planning process because its importance is underestimated. A superannuation fund is unlikely to ever collect this detailed information…if it did, the financial planning industry would be in deeper trouble than it is now as not enough financial planners collect it now.

So the budget will provide an indicative retirement income, throw in a few estimates of other likely costs in retirement and you have a reasonable estimate of the desired retirement income…providing for this should be the primary goal. This income estimate leads to the magical figure to provide financial security…or for some, financial independence.

To calculate what we need to provide this retirement income we simply look up lifetime inflation linked annuity rates. Currently a couple of around age 65 will get inflation linked income at around 4%…so to provide an inflation linked income of ~$60,000pa requires around $1.5million in today’s dollars. This is an example of the capital goal at retirement BUT it is in today’s dollars, so moving forward it must be adjusted for inflation, plus, it is using today’s interest rates, so will also adjust as interest rates go up and down…which therefore results in moving annuity rates. Finally, the desired lifestyle spend may change so this needs to stay updated also as part of the financial planning process.

Now, I know many investors and financial advisers will object to my use of inflation linked lifetime annuities from a life company because there is a belief that they offer returns that are poor and they can do better. I’ll be succinct…noone can do better without taking on some risk…therefore there is a risk of failure if you choose to ignore the inflation linked lifetime annuity rates so you probably need to increase the capital goal in today’s dollars above that of the annuitised value…just in case….happy to argue this point another time. Please note, I’m not saying inflation linked lifetime annuity rates are good…they’re just one of the closest investments we have representing the risk free inflation-linked rate for retirement…so by definition as a risk free rate approximation of course the returns should be low.

Finally, using a client’s net assets, and a conservative estimate for future net savings, the financial planner can calculate the desired real return for achieving the desired capital goal…this desired real return should then dictate the strategy or asset allocation of the investment portfolio and must adjust regularly based on changing goals, savings, and investment performance…much easier said than done…but definitely doable. The final point to the recommended strategy is that the desired real return must consider risk tolerance levels…and if the return goal is too high for tolerance levels…then so too may be the retirement income goals, so adjustments are a must.

What this all adds up to is a process that is personalised, objectives based, and adjusts according to client needs, circumstances, goals, market conditions, and clearly requires an ongoing advice relationship. In comparison, a product solution will always be sub-optimal and always reliant upon strong markets. This path dependency (i.e. market performance reliance) is why life-cycle solutions will never replace good financial planning and whilst they may be good solutions at a cohort level, will always be a poor solution for an individual.

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Oct 11

Australian Bonds and Equities…who would’ve thought?

Aust Shares vs Aust Bonds - Last 5 Years

Source: Morningstar Direct, Delta Research & Advisory

Over the last 5 years their performance has been pretty much the same…with the obvious exception that equities has bee a much much wilder ride. The reality of bonds in this global economy is that the outlook is still not that great from the major players (US, Japan, Europe, and in a sense, China) and so there has been and probably will continue to be, at least in the short term, a low interest rate environment. I say, in a sense china, because their rate of economic growth is slowing and that is clearly having a negative effect on the Australian economy.

Moving forward, whilst I do believe equities is a better place for higher returns than bonds, I’m not expecting the disastrous returns for bonds that so many commentators are talking about. The Australian economy is transitioning away from a resources-led economic boom and at this stage, there is still nothing there to replace it. Economic growth forecasts aren’t that high and neither should they be. Apart from what I’ve already mentioned, the government appears hardly likely to hand the economy any additional fiscal support and it all adds up to lower levels of average earnings growth too. There are a few other factors I won’t dwell on, but expectations over the next few years should be continued low inflation, low interest rates, low sharemarket returns, and a tough time for the baby boomers as they add fuel to the fire by selling their expensive properties to maintain their retirement lifestyle…so lower residential property returns too.

The one major variable that could change it all is the Aussie dollar. Its currently around $0.88USD and if that continues towards a sustained $0.80USD or below, then the attraction for Australian investment and spending will go beyond the current attraction of higher interest rates and towards industries such as manufacturing, tourism, and our services (e.g. education). But until that happens the investment landscape is bound to be tough…unemployment will continue to increase, our wages will still be globally high, and the spending will continue to be low by recent historic standards.

Whilst I don’t believe we’re necessarily heading for any disastrous recession, far from it, I simply believe our complacent view of the Australian economy and expected market returns require an adjustment downwards. And, if you don’t believe me…perhaps you’ll agree with the bond market (see chart below) with government yields suggesting longer term growth expectations are lower than last year and the year before.

Aust Government Bond Yield Curve - 11 Oct 2014

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Oct 07

SPIVA Report…strong evidence supporting active management in small caps…not much else

My favourite simple performance report on active management came out today on the Australian market…it can be downloaded by clicking here. Unfortunately active management for the broad asset classes once again came up looking poor with an overwhelming proportion failing to outperform broad indices for Australian Shares, International Shares, Australian REITs, and Australian Bonds. An enormous proportion of active managers were successful in outperforming their Small Cap Australian shares benchmark thus providing some support for the widely held belief that markets are a little less efficient in small cap land.

Anyway, if you don’t want to download the report the result I’m talking to just look at Table 1 below….

Table 1 – Percentage of Funds Outperformed by the Index

SPIVA Australia Results - June 2014Source: SPIVA Australia Scorecard – Mid June 2014

This report is one of my favourites because it takes survivorship bias into consideration…it does this by only surveying funds that were around at the start of the survey period, as opposed to those at the end of the period (which obviously leaves only the good ones). Its also worth pointing out that this is a survey of retail unit trusts so they clearly come with higher fees but lets face it, access to wholesale funds for almost everyone still has platform fees on top.

Of course retail index managers still may cost up to 90bps in these various categories (which is quite appalling in my humble opinion) and they are guaranteed to underperform so its not necessarily as compelling a case for index funds as it appears…but those 3 and 5 year numbers are pretty bad (except for small cap).

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Sep 27

Bill Gross leaves PIMCO…might lead to a downgrade or two

Irrespective of the quality of the rest of the firm, and there is a lot of quality, with the departure of Mohammed El Erian at the start of the year and now Bill Gross, it doesn’t take much to guess there may be a little destabilisation at the PIMCO offices for a while. Whilst Bill was the manager of the world’s biggest fund, the $220billion+ Total Return Strategy, he is also the manager of the PIMCO Global Bond fund which is one of the more popular global bond funds in the Australian market…so things could get interesting locally too.

When purchasing a managed fund, as much as the funds try and sell you on their process and systems, the final investment decision rests with the chief portfolio manager and when he or she leaves, so will their performance…that’s not to say performance will be bad, but it will be different as each manager has their own style. Therefore the return behaviour of the PIMCO Global Bond fund will differ when the new manager, most likely the very competent Scott Mather, brings his new style to the table. Throw in the fact that Bill’s departure will destabilise the business somewhat, I’m pretty confident we will see a raft of HOLD, FUND WATCH ratings, and given the high institutional following maybe even some SELL ratings.

Why a SELL rating? There is every chance the outflows from the funds that Bill Gross managed will be enormous as it is likely many large institutions will show their loyalty to Bill and take their funds to his new home at Janus ro simply elsewhere. So this massive outflow may put some downward pressure on their funds that could be forced sellers…so from an investor’s perspective…it may be better to get out now than be locked up for an indefinite period. I hope I’m wrong, but I can’t really think of the last time a manager of a world’s largest fund quit and moved to another company so to be honest…I don’t really know.

No matter what happens this departure will provide somewhat of a prelude as to what may happen when the world’s greatest investor, Warren Buffett, is no longer at the helm of Berkshire Hathaway. Whilst Warren is the world’s greatest investor, please keep in mind that in the world of bonds there is no bigger name than Bill Gross.


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